1991 India–Pakistan Agreement: Maritime Confidence-Building, Naval Safety and Risks of Escalation

Recent Developments:

• A naval incident involving PNS Hunain and an Indian Navy warship in the North Arabian Sea has brought renewed attention to the 1991 India–Pakistan Agreement on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troop Movements.
• According to India, the Pakistani naval vessel approached an Indian warship at high speed during a routine surveillance mission and manoeuvred unsafely, resulting in a minor collision; India stated that the incident occurred in international waters and that its vessel suffered no damage.
• Pakistan has presented a different account, stating that the Indian vessel entered an area within Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone during its naval exercise and that the incident involved a dangerous manoeuvre by the Indian vessel. The competing accounts mean that the precise circumstances and responsibility remain disputed.
• India stated that the conduct was unacceptable and unprofessional and referred to Article 10 of the 1991 Agreement, which requires naval ships and submarines of the two countries to maintain a minimum separation of 3 nautical miles in international waters.

The 2011 Naval Precedent:

PNS Babur–INS Godavari Incident:

• A similar naval encounter occurred in June 2011, when Pakistani warship PNS Babur came into contact with Indian Navy frigate INS Godavari in the Gulf of Aden.
• The incident caused minor damage to the Indian vessel’s helicopter safety net and was subsequently taken up through diplomatic channels.
• The Ministry of External Affairs recorded India’s protest over the Pakistani vessel’s conduct and specifically referred to Article 10 of the 1991 Agreement.
• The 2011 episode demonstrates that the 1991 agreement continues to provide a reference point for addressing potentially dangerous naval encounters between the two countries.

Maritime Zones under UNCLOS:

Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone:

• Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a coastal state’s territorial sea extends up to 12 nautical miles from its baselines and forms part of the state’s sovereign territory, subject to applicable international law.
• 1 nautical mile equals 1.852 kilometres, making 12 nautical miles approximately 22.2 kilometres.
• The Exclusive Economic Zone extends up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines, within which the coastal state has sovereign rights over natural resources and jurisdiction over specified activities.
• An EEZ should not be equated with territorial waters because other states retain certain freedoms, including navigation, within the EEZ under international law.
• The distinction between territorial sea, EEZ and international waters is therefore important when assessing naval activities and competing maritime claims.

The 1991 India–Pakistan Agreement Explained:

Purpose and Confidence-Building Framework:

• The Agreement between India and Pakistan on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troop Movements was signed in April 1991 to reduce the possibility of crises arising from the misinterpretation of military activities.
• The agreement forms part of the broader confidence-building measures developed by India and Pakistan to reduce military risks and improve strategic stability.
• It requires both sides to provide specified advance information about certain military exercises and establishes rules intended to prevent dangerous military encounters.

Major Provisions:

• Major military exercises close to the other country’s territory are subject to agreed restrictions, notification requirements and procedures designed to reduce uncertainty.
• Specified exercises require different periods of advance notification, including 15 days for certain air and naval exercises, 60 days for corps-level exercises and 90 days for army-level exercises.
• Either country may seek clarification regarding the assembly, direction, extent and duration of military exercises.
• A major naval exercise is defined in the agreement in terms of the participation of 6 or more ships of destroyer or frigate size and above exercising together and crossing into the other country’s EEZ.
• Article 10 requires naval ships and submarines of India and Pakistan to maintain a minimum separation of 3 nautical miles from one another in international waters to reduce the risk of accidents.
• The agreement also contains provisions concerning military aircraft, including restrictions on combat aircraft operating close to the other country’s airspace and specified exceptions for aircraft operating from designated locations.
• On the same day, the two countries also signed the Agreement on Prevention of Air Space Violations and for Permitting Over Flights and Landings by Military Aircraft, creating a parallel framework for reducing risks from military aviation.

Why Was the 1991 Agreement Signed?

Strategic Context of the 1980s:

• The 1980s witnessed the development of several India–Pakistan confidence-building measures against the background of heightened regional tensions and military competition.
• The development of nuclear weapons programmes in both countries increased the potential consequences of military miscalculation and strengthened the need for mechanisms to prevent unintended escalation.
• The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 altered South Asian security dynamics and increased the importance of stability along Pakistan’s eastern frontier.
• The immediate military trigger was the large-scale Exercise Brass Tacks, conducted by India in 1986–87 near the Pakistan border.
• The exercise involved substantial military mobilisation, including armoured and mechanised formations, alongside air and naval activities, generating serious Pakistani security concerns.
• The episode demonstrated how large military exercises can create uncertainty about intentions and highlighted the need for prior notification, transparency and communication mechanisms.

Importance of the Agreement for Strategic Stability:

Preventing Miscalculation:

• Military vessels and aircraft frequently operate in proximity to one another, making clear operational rules important for preventing accidental encounters from becoming military crises.
• The 1991 agreement provides a rules-based framework for communicating military activities and maintaining minimum separation during potentially sensitive encounters.
• Such arrangements are particularly significant in South Asia because India and Pakistan are nuclear-armed states, making escalation management an important component of regional security.
• Confidence-building agreements cannot eliminate strategic rivalry, but they can reduce the probability that misperception, miscalculation or an accident will trigger an unintended escalation.

Naval Ramming and Maritime Encounters:

Historical Context:

• Ramming is an ancient naval tactic that was used by Greek and Roman fleets, where reinforced vessels attempted to damage or sink enemy ships through direct impact.
• The tactic reappeared in modern naval warfare, including the Battle of Hampton Roads in 1862, during the American Civil War, when CSS Virginia used its ram against USS Cumberland.
• Naval collisions and deliberate vessel contact also occurred during the World Wars and later maritime disputes, including the Cod Wars between Iceland and the United Kingdom.
• In the modern era, close-quarters manoeuvring can have significant strategic implications because sophisticated warships operate with advanced sensors, weapons systems and aircraft.

Grey-Zone Activities and Maritime Security:

Concept of Grey-Zone Operations:

• Grey-zone activities refer to coercive or competitive actions that remain below the conventional threshold of open armed conflict while attempting to secure strategic objectives.
• Maritime grey-zone activities can include dangerous manoeuvring, ramming, blocking, water-cannon use, maritime militia operations and coercive law-enforcement actions.
• Such activities can create ambiguity over whether an incident constitutes an accident, coercion or a deliberate use of force.
• Similar patterns have been observed in maritime disputes in the South China Sea, particularly in encounters involving Chinese and Philippine vessels.
• However, the classification of any particular India–Pakistan naval incident as a grey-zone operation requires evidence regarding intent, and the current 2026 incident has competing official accounts.

Implications for India and Pakistan:

Maritime and Diplomatic Dimensions:

• The Arabian Sea is strategically important because it connects the Indian Ocean with the Persian Gulf and wider West Asian maritime routes.
• Naval surveillance, exercises and commercial shipping therefore increase the importance of predictable rules for military encounters.
• The 2026 incident also demonstrates the importance of maintaining military-to-military communication channels alongside diplomatic mechanisms.
• Prompt diplomatic engagement can help prevent an isolated maritime accident from becoming a broader security crisis.
• Existing agreements should be complemented by clearer procedures for incident reporting, investigation, deconfliction and emergency communication.

Way Forward:

Strengthening Maritime Confidence-Building Measures:

• India and Pakistan should continue using existing bilateral mechanisms to clarify incidents and prevent miscalculation and unintended escalation.
• Both sides can strengthen practical maritime protocols covering safe manoeuvring, communication, separation distances, incident investigation and emergency signalling.
• Regular professional interaction between naval authorities, where politically feasible, can improve mutual understanding of operational procedures.
• Greater transparency regarding major naval exercises can reduce uncertainty and prevent routine deployments from being misinterpreted.
• The principles of UNCLOS, navigational safety and established international maritime practices should remain central to managing naval encounters.
• Confidence-building measures should be viewed as risk-reduction mechanisms rather than substitutes for resolving underlying bilateral disputes.

Value Addition for UPSC:

Prelims Facts:

• 1991 Agreement: Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troop Movements.
• Article 10: Minimum 3 nautical miles separation between Indian and Pakistani naval ships and submarines in international waters.
• Territorial sea: Up to 12 nautical miles.
• Exclusive Economic Zone: Up to 200 nautical miles.
• 1 nautical mile: 1.852 kilometres.
• 2011 precedent: PNS Babur–INS Godavari incident in the Gulf of Aden.
• Major historical trigger: Exercise Brass Tacks, 1986–87.
• Related 1991 agreement: Prevention of Air Space Violations and arrangements for overflights and landings by military aircraft.

Mains Linkages:

• International Relations: UNCLOS, maritime zones, strategic stability and rules-based maritime conduct.
• Security: Grey-zone activities, escalation management, military transparency and crisis communication.
• Essay: “In a nuclearised neighbourhood, preventing miscalculation can be as important as deterring deliberate aggression.”

Conclusion:

• The 2026 naval collision has renewed attention to the 1991 India–Pakistan confidence-building framework, particularly Article 10.
• While India and Pakistan have presented different accounts of the incident, the episode demonstrates the continuing importance of clearly defined operational rules and communication mechanisms at sea.
• For two nuclear-armed neighbours, strengthening maritime safety, transparency, crisis communication and confidence-building measures remains essential to ensure that accidental encounters do not develop into wider strategic crises.